Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation
Carlos E. Jiménez-Angueira; Nathan V. Stuart
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Jiménez-Angueira, Carlos E. ; Stuart, Nathan V. |
| Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - New York, NY : Springer, ISSN 0924-865X, ZDB-ID 1087855-5. - Vol. 44.2015, 4, p. 701-732
|
| Subject: | CEO compensation | Relative performance evaluation | Pay-for-luck | Accounting performance | Efficient contracting | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333147