{Relative Strength of Strategy Elimination Procedures

We compare here the relative strength of four widely used procedures on finite strategic games: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. A complication is that none of these procedures is based on a monotonic operator. To deal with this problem we use 'global' versions of these operators

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Year of publication:	2007-06-07
Authors:	Apt, Krzysztof
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2007, 21, p. 1-9
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836288