Relative utilitarianism an improved axiomatisation

In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakened versions of Arrow's axioms has a unique solution. "Relative Utilitarianism" consists of first normalising individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities between 0 and 1 and then summing them. This axiomatisation largely supersedes the one in Dhillon and Mertens (1993).

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Year of publication:	1996-11-07
Authors:	DHILLON, Amrita ; MERTENS, Jean-François
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	Axiomatisation \| Social Choice \| Social Welfare Function \| Utilitarianism \| Welfarism \| Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem \| Expected Utility

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 1996055
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043190