Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment

A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We drop such assumption and we show that costless electoral campaign can be an effective way of transmitting information to voters. The result is robust to relevant equilibrium refinements. An unavoidable proportion of ambiguous politicians emerges.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Triossi, Matteo
Institutions:	Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino
Subject:	Information Transmission \| Electoral Campaign \| Endogenous Commitment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 21 27 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; P16 - Political Economy ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405552