Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency : contracting with non-exponential discounting
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cetemen, Doruk ; Feng, Felix Zhiyu ; Urgun, Can |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 208.2023, p. 1-49
|
Subject: | Continuous-time contracting | Dynamic inconsistency | Renegotiation | Extended HJB system | Non-atomic games | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Diskontierung | Discounting | Vertrag | Contract | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations |
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