Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule.

We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting in an economy where ex-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in a higher expected level of investment in comparison to the case where social insurance is determined by an appointed social planner.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Anderberg, D. ; Perroni, C.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Subject:	INSURANCE \| EDUCATION \| INCOME \| VOTING

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Series:	The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	28 pages
Classification:	H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178308