Renegotiation of social contracts by majority rule
Dan Anderberg and Carlo Perroni
| Year of publication: |
2000
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Anderberg, Dan |
| Other Persons: | Perroni, Carlo (contributor) |
| Publisher: |
Copenhagen : Economic Policy Research Unit, Copenhagen Business School |
| Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Verfassungsökonomik | Constitutional economics | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
| Extent: | 28, [10] S. |
|---|---|
| Series: | Working paper series. - Copenhagen : EPRU, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, ISSN 0908-7745, ZDB-ID 2937441-8. - Vol. 2000,15 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Literaturverz. S. 27 - 28 |
| Classification: | H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014378778