Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player

We consider an extension of Tullock's (1980) N-player contest under which prize valuations may vary across players. We show that the pure-strategy equilibrium of this contest is unique. We also establish the following results: rent dissipation increases, individual winning probabilities decrease, and individual spending either increases or decreases with the addition of a player. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Matros, Alexander
Published in:	Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 129.2006, 3, p. 369-380
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005542637