Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And

We consider the “and” communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Gossner, Olivier ; Vieille, Nicolas
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	"And" communication device

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, Vol. 30, no. 1. pp. 41-60.Length: 19 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074212