Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
by Drew Fudenberg and Yuichi Yamamoto
| Year of publication: |
2010
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi |
| Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 78.2010, 5, p. 1673-1710
|
| Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Signalling | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008798255