Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Nieken, Petra ; Schmitz, Patrick W.
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	Moral Hazard \| Vertragsrecht \| Zeit \| Test \| Repeated moral hazard \| Sequential hidden actions \| Laboratory experiment

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Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 372
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13182 [DOI] 720710251 [GVK] hdl:10419/93828 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:372 [RePEc]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010333805