Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Nieken, Petra ; Schmitz, Patrick W.
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 75.2012, 2, p. 1000-1008
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Repeated moral hazard \| Sequential hidden actions \| Laboratory experiment

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010573667