Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.

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Year of publication:	2012-02
Authors:	Nieken, Petra ; Schmitz, Patrick W.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Repeated moral hazard \| Sequential hidden actions \| Laboratory experiment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010860229