Replication invariance on NTU games

Two concepts of replication (conflictual and non-conflictual) are extended from the class of pure bargaining games to the class of NTU games. The behavior of the Harsanyi, Shapley NTU, Egalitarian and Maschler-Owen solutions of the replica games is compared with that of the Nash and Egalitarian solutions in pure bargaining games.

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Year of publication:	2001-05-04
Authors:	Calvo, Emilio ; Garci´a, Iñaki ; Zarzuelo, José M.
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 29.2001, 4, p. 473-486
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	NTU games \| NTU solutions \| replication

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received June 1995/Final version February 2000
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375691