Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium

This note establishes that in every 3-3 symmetric game, the replicator dynamics eliminates all strategies that are never used in correlated equilibrium. This extends to the best-response dynamics and to any convex monotonic dynamics. The proof is based on dual reduction.

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Year of publication:	2004-12
Authors:	Viossat, Yannick
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Dual reduction \| Game-dynamics \| Correlated equilibrium \| Réduction duale \| Dynamiques de jeux \| Equilibre correlé

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Cahiers du Laboratoire d'Econométrie, 2004
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706397