Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
Year of publication: |
1996
|
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Authors: | Aoyagi, Masaki |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 71.1996, 2, p. 378-393
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Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Reputation | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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