Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay : evidence from option backdating
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ertimur, Yonca ; Ferri, Fabrizio ; Maber, David A. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 104.2012, 1, p. 118-144
|
Subject: | Option backdating | Director labor market | Shareholder voting | Director turnover | Corporate governance | Corporate Governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Vorstand | Executive board | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Reputation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Aktienstimmrecht | Shareholder voting rights |
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