Resistance to truthful revelation in bargaining : persistent bid shading and the play of dominated strategies
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Parco, James E. ; Murphy, Ryan O. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic psychology : research in economic psychology and behavioral economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-4870, ZDB-ID 865181-4. - Vol. 39.2013, p. 154-170
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Subject: | Bilateral bargaining | Information framing | Truthful revelation | Sealed bid mechanism | k-double auction | Linear equilibrium strategy | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Experiment | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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