Resolving Lawsuits with a Decisive Oath : An Economic Analysis

The decisive oath is an interesting but little-known element in some legal proceedings, mostly in civil law traditions. It is different from ordinary (testimonial) oaths that are routinely administered to witnesses at trial with the aim of eliciting only truthful testimony, but which are of dubious value in achieving that end. By contrast, a decisive oath can end a lawsuit in cases where the plaintiff has no evidence. We use a simple economic model of litigation to examine the impact of the decisive oath in resolving lawsuits. To test the implications of the model, we focus on the relationship between the stakes of the case and litigation outcomes by using data from the early nineteenth century Ottoman courts. The results show that as the stakes increased (1) among cases lacking evidence, resolution by oath was more likely than settlement; (2) among cases not settling, plaintiffs were less likely to request an oath; and (3) among cases where the plaintiff requested an oath, the defendant was more likely to take the oath. Our analysis contributes both to the theoretical literature on the economics of dispute resolution, and to the historical literature on the role of decisive oaths in resolving legal disputes, especially in Islamic societies