Response to "A note on Brandl and Brandt's axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium"

Schroeder (2025) claims that the solution concept, which, for each n-player game, returns the set of all strategy profiles where each player's strategy has full support, constitutes a counter-example to the characterization by Brandl and Brandt (2024). We show that this is not true because this solution concept violates consequentialism.

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Year of publication:	2025-01-14
Authors:	Brandl, Florian ; Brandt, Felix

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Brandl, Florian and Brandt, Felix (2025): Response to "A note on Brandl and Brandt's axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium".
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015214812