Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché

In this paper, I study the strategic interactions between a country that owns a monopoly on a polluting non renewable resource (basically, the OPEC), and a representative of countries that both consume the resource and are hurt by its pollution. Both pollution control and rent captation are at stake in this model.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Belgodere, Antoine

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English ; French
Notes:	Belgodere, Antoine (2007): Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché.
Classification:	Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225315