Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Albano, Gian ; Germano, Fabrizio ; Lovo, Stefano |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 10.2006, 1, p. 1-8
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Ascending auctions for multiple objects | Clock auctions | FCC auctions | Collusion | Retaliation |
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