Rewards and penalties in an evolutionary game theoretic model of international environmental agreements
| Year of publication: |
2022
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Luqman, Muhammad ; Soytaş, Uǧur ; Li, Yafei ; Ahmad, Najid |
| Published in: |
Economic research. - Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN 1331-677X, ZDB-ID 2171828-3. - Vol. 35.2022, 1,1, p. 602-621
|
| Subject: | Free-rider problem | international environmental agreements | pollution control | evolutionary game theory | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy | Koalition | Coalition |
-
Shinohara, Ryusuke, (2021)
-
International environmental agreements under different evolutionary imitation mechanisms
Chen, Hsiao-Chi, (2023)
-
McGinty, Matthew, (2020)
- More ...
-
Luqman, Muhammad, (2024)
-
Managerial R&D Hands-on Experience, State Ownership, and Corporate Innovation
Li, Yafei, (2022)
-
Corporate social responsibility and green innovation : evidence from mandatory CSR disclosure laws
Mbanyele, William, (2022)
- More ...