Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game

We show in a sender-receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth-telling. Subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities. The amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth-telling.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Peeters, Ronald ; Vorsatz, Marc ; Walzl, Markus
Institutions:	Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
Subject:	microeconomics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Research Memoranda.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Research Memoranda Number 019
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670192