Risk aversion, reservation utility and bargaining power : an evolutionary algorithm approximation of incentive contracts
| Year of publication: |
2024
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Curiel, Itza ; Di Giannatale, Sonia ; Labrador-Badía, Giselle |
| Published in: |
Computational economics. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1572-9974, ZDB-ID 1477445-8. - Vol. 63.2024, 2, p. 477-511
|
| Subject: | Evolutionary algorithms | Moral hazard | Optimization | Moral Hazard | Evolutionärer Algorithmus | Evolutionary algorithm | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Verhandlungsmacht | Bargaining power | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Evolutionsökonomik | Evolutionary economics | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
-
Optimal management of supply disruptions when contracting with unreliable, risk-averse, suppliers
Parlane, Sarah, (2017)
-
Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts
Dittrich, Marcus, (2014)
-
Evidence of moral hazard in employee performance : an empirical analysis of contract theory
Panicker, Preetha G., (2023)
- More ...
-
Monitoring decisions in vertical integration
Di Giannatale, Sonia, (2021)
-
The Dynamics of Bargaining Power in a Principal-Agent Model
Di Giannatale, Sonia, (2022)
-
The dynamics of bargaining power in a principal-agent model
Di Giannatale, Sonia, (2023)
- More ...