Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs' compensation
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre |
Published in: |
Journal of financial stability. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1572-3089, ZDB-ID 2222049-5. - Vol. 9.2013, 4, p. 778-789
|
Subject: | Banking regulation | CEO incentives | Corporate governance | Moral hazard | Führungskräfte | Managers | Moral Hazard | Corporate Governance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Theorie | Theory | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Einlagensicherung | Deposit insurance | Regulierung | Regulation | Bank | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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