Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts : experimental evidence
Mathieu Lefebvre; Ferdinand M. Vieider
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Lefebvre, Mathieu ; Vieider, Ferdinand M. |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 97.2014, p. 27-36
|
| Subject: | Executive compensation | Risk preferences | Experimental finance | Prospect theory | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Prospect Theory | Experiment | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Entscheidung unter Risiko | Decision under risk | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010339135