Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Tilman Börgers; Doug Smith
| Year of publication: |
2014
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Börgers, Tilman ; Smith, Doug |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 9.2014, 2, p. 339-360
|
| Subject: | Robust mechanism design | Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010386078