Robustly coalition-proof incentive mechanisms for public good provision are voting mechanisms and vice versa
Felix J. Bierbrauer and Martin F. Hellwig
| Year of publication: |
October 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Bierbrauer, Felix ; Hellwig, Martin |
| Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 83.2016, 4, p. 1440-1464
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| Subject: | Public-good provision | Mechanism design | Voting mechanisms | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Koalition | Coalition | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem | Anreiz | Incentives | Allokation | Allocation |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1093/restud/rdw015 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011656540