Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof

I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player's actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.

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Year of publication:	2007-09-18
Authors:	Nouweland, Anne van den
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2007, 43, p. 1-6
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630259