Rotating Saving and Credit Associations in Cameroon: Contractual arrangements between members

The dissertation examines an informal financial institution in Cameroon: the Rotating Saving and Credit Association. Its describes the operational procedures. RoSCAs are associations formed by a core of individuals who willingly and regularly contribute periodically a fixed or variable amount to a fund which is awarded according to the random or bidding allocations to a sub-set of members in rotation. Its provides an atheoretical evaluation of default in Cameroonian RoSCAs. RoSCAs with large membership sizes and which operate an informal insurance fund experience more partial defaults than otherwise. RoSCAs which take place at variable location experience less defaults than RoSCAs at fix locations. Its attempts to compute the interest rates in bidding RoSCAs and highlights the determinants of the bids. Finally, RoSCAs are modeled in a dynamic stochastic framework. In the calibrated economy, it is proven that there are membership size and contribution in RoSCAs where, on average members derive ex-ante, less utility than if they would living in autarky. There are optimal membership sizes and contribution in which members derive more utility than any other RoSCA. Finally, poor members benefit relatively more from participating in RoSCAs than wealthy members.