Rules for Aggregating Information

We present a model of information aggregation in which agents' information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-speciﬁed set of individuals

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Chambers, Christopher P.
Other Persons:	Miller, Alan D. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Aggregation \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Information \| Informationsverhalten \| Information behaviour
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 36, pp. 75-82, 2011 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 1, 2010 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133600