Same Power But Different Goals : How Does Knowledge of Opponents’ Power Affect Negotiators' Aspiration in Power-Asymmetric Negotiations?

This article focuses on dyadic negotiations in which negotiators have asymmetric best alternatives to the negotiated agreement (BATNAs). We argue it is important to consider negotiator's knowledge states of opponent's BATNAs. The experimental study also examined how negotiator's perceptions of opponent's BATNAs were formed and how knowledge given to different negotiators affected negotiator aspiration levels. The findings show that Negotiator estimates of opponent BATNAs are affected by their own BATNAs even when the range of possible BATNAs is given; strong negotiator's knowledge of opponent's BATNAs increases their aspiration levels; and weak negotiator's knowledge reduces their aspiration levels. How knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries affects aspiration depends on which party has access to it