SAME SONG, SAME DANCE: EVIDENCE OF PATTERNS IN SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FUNDING

The actions of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission subsequent to a financial crisis appear to follow a predictable set of steps. Each tries to position itself to gain the resources it needs to survive by couching its actions in terms of legitimacy. One outcome is a predictable dance that culminates with the annual funding process. The events surrounding the financial collapse of Lehman Brothers and the resulting scrutiny of the Securities and Exchange Commission are hardly unique. In fact, they appear to be the predictable result of a period of boom and bust. These predictions are based on the historical behavior of politicians in funding the Commission. This paper uses an institutional theory perspective to examine the funding patterns in the wake of the collapse of Enron in 2001 and the global financial crisis precipitated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Implications for the Securities and Exchange Commission are provided.