Satisficing in strategic environments: a theoretical approach and experimental evidence

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, Maria Vittoria ; Ploner, Matteo
Publisher:	Jena : Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Subject:	Beschränkte Rationalität \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Test \| Strategic interaction \| satisficing behavior \| bounded rationality

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Series:	Jena Economic Research Papers ; 2008,078
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	584528973 [GVK] hdl:10419/31733 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275039