Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. We formally define the concept of satisficing and propose a theory that allows satisficing players to make "optimal" decisions without being equipped with any prior. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Vittoria Levati, M. ; Ploner, Matteo
Published in:	Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics). - Elsevier, ISSN 2214-8043. - Vol. 39.2010, 5, p. 554-561
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Strategic interaction Satisficing behavior Bounded rationality

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008869084