Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-management Appointments
We show that relatively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments for securities offerings. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase the banks' chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Ljungqvist, Alexander ; Marston, Felicia ; Wilhelm, William J. |
Published in: |
Review of Financial Studies. - Society for Financial Studies - SFS. - Vol. 22.2009, 10, p. 3977-4007
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Publisher: |
Society for Financial Studies - SFS |
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