School choice with asymmetric information : priority design and the curse of acceptance
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Kloosterman, Andrew ; Troyan, Peter |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 15.2020, 3, p. 1095-1133
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Subject: | Matching | stability | asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Schulauswahl | School choice |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE3621 [DOI] hdl:10419/253474 [Handle] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47 |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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