School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kloosterman, Andrew ; Troyan, Peter |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 15.2020, 3, p. 1095-1133
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Matching | stability | asymmetric information |
Type of publication: | Article |
---|---|
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE3621 [DOI] 1738540057 [GVK] hdl:10419/253474 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:3621 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47 |
Source: |
-
School choice with asymmetric information : priority design and the curse of acceptance
Kloosterman, Andrew, (2020)
-
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance : acyclicity and dropping strategies
Tello, BenjamÃn, (2018)
-
Informational hold up and intermediaries
Utgoff, Naomi, (2022)
- More ...
-
School choice with asymmetric information : Priority design and the curse of acceptance
Kloosterman, Andrew, (2020)
-
Troyan, Peter, (2018)
-
Troyan, Peter, (2020)
- More ...