Screening for breakthroughs

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander

How best to incentivise disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.

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Year of publication:	2025
Authors:	Curello, Gregorio ; Sinander, Ludvig
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 20.2025, 4, p. 1323-1365
Subject:	Dynamic mechanism design \| delegation \| disclosure \| deadline \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Unternehmenspublizität \| Corporate disclosure \| Signalling

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE6247 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015532995