Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences
Katsuhiko Nishizaki
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Nishizaki, Katsuhiko |
| Published in: |
Research in economics : an international review of economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1090-9443, ZDB-ID 1379004-3. - Vol. 72.2018, 3, p. 379-383
|
| Subject: | Dominant strategy implementation | Linear production economy | Nash implementation | Secure implementation | Strategy-proofness | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Allokation | Allocation |
| Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Erratum enthalten in: Volume 75, No. 1, March 2021, Seite 129-130 |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.rie.2018.07.003 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041875