Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
Alejandro Saporiti
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Saporiti, Alejandro |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 154.2014, p. 216-228
|
| Subject: | Secure implementation | Partial honesty | Strategy-proofness | Rectangularity | Single-crossing preferences | Representative (median) voter | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010481364