Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior.
Selection dynamics are often used to distinguish stable and unstable equilibria. This is particularly useful when multiple equilibria prevent a priori comparative static analysis. This paper reports an experiment designed to compare the accuracy of the myopic best-response dynamic and an inertial selection dynamic. The inertial selection dynamic makes more accurate predictions about the observed mutual best-response outcomes. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Huyck, John B Van ; Cook, Joseph P ; Battalio, Raymond C |
Published in: |
Journal of Political Economy. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 102.1994, 5, p. 975-1005
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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