Self-admissible sets
Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of "rationality and common belief of rationality." When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes "rationality and common assumption of rationality." We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest--Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games.
| Year of publication: |
2010
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Brandenburger, Adam ; Friedenberg, Amanda |
| Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 145.2010, 2, p. 785-811
|
| Publisher: |
Elsevier |
| Keywords: | Admissibility Weak dominance Self-admissible sets Iterated admissibility Epistemic game theory Perfect-information games |
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