Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery

This article is concerned with explaining why states in which bribe-payers are located (?payor states?) criminalize transnational bribery. Some analysts have claimed that these initiatives are either examples of altruistic behaviour on the part of payor states or reflect economic interdependence between payor states and the states over which officials who receive bribes have jurisdiction (?payee states?). This article offers an alternative explanation namely, that those initiatives are methods by which payor states self-interestedly attempt to improve the terms upon which their nationals obtain the services of foreign public officials. After describing in a general way the forms of transnational bribery that payor states have an interest in deterring, the article examines several recent anti-bribery initiatives for evidence that they have been motivated by self-interest as opposed to altruism. Although the legislation in question is not patently designed to further economic interests it is more likely to be enforced in cases in which firms would find it advantageous in economic terms to be deterred from paying bribes than in other cases. Consequently, the existence of anti-bribery legislation in payor states is consistent with the hypothesis that payor states deter transnational bribery for self-interested reasons