Sender-receiver games with cooperation

We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent ("talk and cooperate equilibrium", TCE). We establish that a TCE exists provided that the receiver has a "uniform punishment decision" (UPD) against the sender.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Forges, Françoise ; Horst, Ulrich
Publisher:	München und Berlin : Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Subject:	sender-receiver game \| commitment \| cooperative solution \| individual rationality

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Series:	Discussion Paper ; 17
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	883102722 [GVK] hdl:10419/162523 [Handle] RePEc:rco:dpaper:17 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663463