Seniority in Legislature

AbstractWe construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

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Authors:	MCKELVEY, RICHARD D. ; RIEZMAN, RAYMOND
Published in:	International Trade Agreements and Political Economy.
Subject:	International Trade \| Political Economy \| Theory of International Free Trade Agreements \| Customs Unions \| Tariff Dynamics \| Storable Votes

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	P16 - Political Economy ; F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206565