Sensitivity analysis of markup equilibria in complementary markets
José R. Correa; Roger Lederman; Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Correa, José R. ; Lederman, Roger ; Stier-Moses, Nicolás E. |
| Published in: |
Operations research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 720735-9. - Vol. 42.2014, 2, p. 173-179
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| Subject: | Noncooperative games | Oligopoly models | Supply function equilibrium | Bundling | Pricing | Sensitivity analysis | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Sensitivitätsanalyse | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Preiselastizität | Price elasticity | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Mark-up Pricing | Mark-up pricing | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364563