Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Szkup, Michal ; Trevino, Isabel |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 124.2020, p. 534-553
|
Subject: | Biased beliefs | Coordination | Global games | Information structures | Sentiments | Strategic uncertainty | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koordination | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Experiment | Emotion | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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