Sequencing of Peacemaking in Emerging Conflicts

Third-party peacemaking is common and comes in many shapes and forms. Research has found that in the context of emerging intrastate armed conflicts some peacemaking tools are more efficient that others, whereas some are even detrimental in terms of reaching a negotiated end (Heldt, 2008b). One peacemaking tool may thus cancel out the positive impact of another tool rather than having a synergetic or multiplying effect. Meanwhile, the pattern of peacemaking in emerging conflicts is one of different tools applied seemingly at random. There is no orderly trajectory in that the peacemaking process moves from one tool to another, i.e., that it is sequenced.The idea that different types of actions should be sequenced to generate desired outcomes is common in many areas of research. For instance, there is an old debate on the necessity of sequencing democracy support. Some scholars argue for sequencing, in that some cultural and socio-economic foundations for democracy should be at hand before the international community starts to support democratization. Another approach claims that there is no single path to – or preconditions for – democracy, but that it may arise in all sorts of ways. Timing and sequencing are here considered as inconsequential.Focusing on the period 1993–2004, this chapter is a first cut at statistically assessing whether sequencing of peacemaking influences the probability of emerging intrastate armed conflicts ending through a ceasefire agreement or peace agreement. It reports findings that are overall supportive of the sequencing framework